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Resumo: A interação contínua entre 
dispositivos inteligentes, sensores e 
pessoas aponta para o crescente número 
de dados produzidos, armazenados 
e processados, alterando, em vários 
aspectos e cada vez mais, nosso 
cotidiano. Por um lado, o contexto de 
hiperconectividade pode trazer benefícios 
econômicos ao Estado, às empresas, além 
de conveniência aos consumidores. Por 
outro lado, o aumento da conectividade 
traz desafios significativos nas esferas 
da proteção da privacidade e da ética 
contemporânea, impactando, em última 
análise, a própria democracia. Esta tese 
aborda, do ponto de vista regulatório, 
alguns dos desafios enfrentados pelo 
atual estado de direito decorrente do 
avanço do cenário denominado Internet 
das Coisas.
Abstract: The continuous interaction 
between intelligent devices, sensors and 
people points to the increasing number 
of data being produced, stored and 
processed, changing, in various aspects 
and increasingly, our daily life. On one 
hand, the context of hyperconnectivity 
can bring economic benefits to the State, 
companies, as well as convenience to 
consumers. On the other hand, increasing 
connectivity brings significant challenges 
in the spheres of privacy protection 
and contemporary ethics, impacting, 
ultimately, democracy itself. This thesis 
addresses, from the regulatory point of 
view, some of these challenges faced by 
the current rule of law arising from the 
advance of the scenario called Internet of 
Things.
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From the 1980s, with the progressive development of computers 
in business and public administration, there was a perception that 
governmental and corporate practices in processing personal data were 
reducing individuals to mere data, threatening their fundamental rights 
and their freedom (EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, 
2015).  
On an even larger scale, this is the thesis reinforced by the Israeli 
writer Yuval Noah Harari (HARARI, 2015)1 when dealing with the loss 
1  Harari argues in his work “Homo Deus” that we are moving towards a post-
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of human freedom and what he calls the new religion of data (HARARI, 
2016): 
Humanist thinkers such as Rousseau convinced us that our own 
feelings and desires were the ultimate source of meaning, and 
that our free will was, therefore, the highest authority of all. 
Now, a fresh shift is taking place. Just as divine authority was 
legitimized by religious mythologies, and human authority was 
legitimized by humanist ideologies, so high-tech gurus and 
Silicon Valley prophets are creating a new universal narrative that 
legitimizes the authority of algorithms and Big Data. This novel 
creed may be called “Dataism”. In its extreme form, proponents 
of the Dataist worldview perceive the entire universe as a flow of 
data, see organisms as little more than biochemical algorithms 
and believe that humanity’s cosmic vocation is to create an all-
encompassing data-processing system — and then merge into 
it. We are already becoming tiny chips inside a giant system 
that nobody really understands. Every day I absorb countless 
data bits through emails, phone calls and articles; process the 
data; and transmit back new bits through more emails, phone 
calls and articles. I don’t really know where I fit into the great 
scheme of things, and how my bits of data connect with the bits 
produced by billions of other humans and computers. I don’t 
have time to find out, because I am too busy answering emails. 
This relentless dataflow sparks new inventions and disruptions 
that nobody plans, controls or comprehends. 
[…]
 Even though humanists were wrong to think that our feelings 
reflected some mysterious “free will”, up until now humanism 
still made very good practical sense. For although there was 
nothing magical about our feelings, they were nevertheless the 
best method in the universe for making decisions — and no 
outside system could hope to understand my feelings better than 
me. […]. This is just the beginning. Devices such as Amazon’s 
Kindle are able constantly to collect data on their users while 
they are reading books. Your Kindle can monitor which parts 
of a book you read quickly, and which slowly; on which page 
you took a break, and on which sentence you abandoned the 
book, never to pick it up again. If Kindle was to be upgraded 
anthropocentric world where the value of reality is extracted from constant 
information processing by human and nonhuman agents. In a similar sense, Luciano 
Floridi argues that: “ICTs are bringing about a fourth revolution, in the long process 
of reassessment of humanity’s fundamental nature and role in the universe. We 
are not immobile, at the centre of the universe (Copernican revolution); we are 
not unnaturally distinct and different from the rest of the animal world (Darwinian 
revolution); and we are far from being entirely transparent to ourselves (Freudian 
revolution). ICTs are now making us realize that we are not disconnected agents, 
but informational organisms (inforgs), who share with other kinds of agents a global 
environment, ultimately made of information, the infosphere (Turing revolution)”.
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with face recognition software and biometric sensors, it would 
know how each sentence influenced your heart rate and blood 
pressure. It would know what made you laugh, what made you 
sad, what made you angry. Soon, books will read you while 
you are reading them. And whereas you quickly forget most of 
what you read, computer programs need never forget. Such data 
should eventually enable Amazon to choose books for you with 
uncanny precision. It will also allow Amazon to know exactly 
who you are, and how to press your emotional buttons.
With the growing dissemination of Big Data and computing 
techniques, technological evolution and economic pressure spread 
rapidly and algorithms have become a great resource for innovation and 
business models. This rapid diffusion of algorithms and their increasing 
influence, however, have consequences for the market and for society, 
consequences which include questions of ethics and governance 
(SAURWEIN, 2015, p. 35-49).
Given that algorithms can permeate countless branches of our 
lives as they become more sophisticated, useful, and autonomous, there 
is a risk that they will make important decisions, replacing human 
beings (DIAKOPOULOS, 2015, p.398)2. Accordingly, Danilo Doneda 
and Virgilio Almeida argue that to foment the integration of algorithms 
into social and economic processes, algorithms governance tools 
are needed (DONEDA, 2016, p. 60). The governance of algorithms 
(SAURWEIN; JUST; LATZER, 2015, p. 38-43)3 can vary from the 
strictly legal and regulatory point of view, to the purely technical point 
of view (SAURWEIN, JUST, LATZER, 2015, p. 62).
Among the regulation points are transparency, responsibility - 
which is linked to notions of justice and due process - and technical 
guarantees, as well as the development of ethical principles regarding 
the use of personal data (Big Data Ethics). It should be noted 
that algorithms are constantly working and facing unplanned and 
unprecedented situations frequently, so that their monitoring must be 
constant (SAURWEIN; JUST; LATZER, 2015).
2   As stated by Nicholas Diakopoulos, “We are now living in a world where algorithms, 
and the data that feed them, adjudicate a large array of decisions in our lives: not just 
search engines and personalized online news systems, but educational evaluations, 
the operation of markets and political campaigns, the design of urban public spaces, 
and even how social services like welfare and public safety are managed.” 
3   Among the governance options, which have their limitations and are influenced by 
contextual factors such as incentives and conflicts of interest, we have the following: 
(i) self-organization of individual companies; (ii) collective self-regulation; (iii) co-
regulation and (iv) state intervention.
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One of the main themes raised by doctrine when it comes to 
governance is the opacity of the algorithms. The problem of opacity is 
related to the difficulty of decoding the result generated by the algorithm. 
The human inability to decode the result of algorithms can create 
problems when they are used to make important decisions that affect 
our lives. Thus, there has been talk of the need for greater transparency, 
which could be achieved by regulating (DONEDA; ALMEIDA, 2016, 
p. 60-62).
According to the Report prepared by renowned names in the 
field of Digital Ethics, such as Luciano Floridi and Wendell Wallack 
(WALLACK, 2017):
A lack of scrutability or meaningful transparency can undermine 
the acceptability of deploying systems in situations where harm 
may occur to people, animals, the environment or institutions. 
Should the system fail and cause harm, it becomes critical to 
have a forensic capability to ensure similar accidents or failures 
do not occur, and to determine accountability and liability. This 
is especially important when outcomes are unexpected and/or 
not aligned with the original intent for which the system was 
deployed.
On this issue, researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute and 
Alan Turing Institute deepen the debate (MITTELSTADT, 2016):
The primary components of transparency are accessibility 
and comprehensibility of information. Information about 
the functionality of algorithms is often intentionally poorly 
accessible. Proprietary algorithms are kept secret for the 
sake of competitive advantage, national security, or privacy. 
Transparency can thus run counter to other ethical ideals, 
in particular the privacy of data subjects and autonomy of 
organizations.
[…]
The commercial viability of data processors in many industries 
may be threatened by transparency. However, data subjects 
retain an interest in understanding how information about 
them is created and influences decisions taken in data driven 
practices. This struggle is marked by information asymmetry 
and an ‘‘imbalance in knowledge and decision-making power’’ 
favouring data processors. Besides being accessible, information 
must be comprehensible to be considered transparent. Efforts 
to make algorithms transparent face a significant challenge to 
render complex decision-making processes both accessible and 
comprehensible. The longstanding problem of interpretability in 
machine learning algorithms indicates the challenge of opacity 
in algorithms. […] Transparency disclosures by data processors 
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and controllers may prove crucial in the future to maintain a 
trusting relationship with data subjects.
On the need for greater transparency, it is worth mentioning 
that New York City has recently unanimously approved a bill aimed at 
government agencies that use algorithms to aid in legal proceedings. 
Seen as an algorithmic accountability bill, the first of its kind in North 
American legislative regulation, the standard will establish a task force 
to study how algorithms are used by city agencies to make decisions 
that affect New York citizens. The task force will concentrate its efforts 
on investigating algorithmic bias and whether any of the models 
discriminate against persons based on age, race, religion, gender, sexual 
orientation, or citizenship status (BERNARD, 2017).
As an example, the new North American regulation aims at 
providing a new interpretation on algorithms, avoiding its treatment 
as “black boxes”. It is important to emphasize that companies and 
governmental organizations should try to reduce the algorithmic bias 
and provide as much transparency as possible to the predictive models.
In Europe, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
establishes the right to an explanation for any decision made by an 
algorithm and the right to opt for non-collection of data. Many suggest 
that this pattern is too broad and will have to be revised. However, it 
is working as a tool to hold stakeholders accountable. In addition, it 
has motivated engineers to explore ways to provide a greater degree of 
transparency on how machine learning algorithms make their decisions.
In addition, Google’s chief AI scientist, John Giannandrea, 
highlights the risks of inscrutable systems (KNIGHT, 2017):
It’s important that we be transparent about the training data that 
we are using, and are looking for hidden biases in it, otherwise 
we are building biased systems [...] if someone is trying to sell 
you a black box system for medical decision support, and you 
don’t know how it works or what data was used to train it, then 
I wouldn’t trust it.
Researchers at the University of Zurich (SAURWEIN, 2015, 
p. 37) argue that algorithm governance must be based on identified 
threats and suggest a risk-based approach, highlighting those related to 
manipulation, bias, censorship, social discrimination, privacy breaches, 
property rights and abuse of market power (SAURWEIN, 2015). To 
prevent these risks from materializing, it is necessary to resort to 
governance.
158
Revista Direitos Culturais | Santo Ângelo | v. 13 | n. 31 | p. 153-190 | set./dez. 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20912/rdc.v13i31.2816
Besides the algorithm technology itself, other external factors 
influence its development and the need for its regulation. This is the 
case with databases. Algorithms become more useful as more data 
becomes available (DONEDA, ALMEIDA, 2016, p. 61). If data is 
fundamental to algorithms, which are inert until paired with databases 
(GILLESPIE, 2014, P. 169)4, one must analyze the legal treatment 
given to them, as they must be legitimate, correct, up-to-date and not 
based on illegitimate bias. 
Considering the above, algorithms governance’s techniques 
do not act directly on the algorithms themselves, but on the data that 
feed the algorithms. As noted by Danilo Doneda and Virgilio Almeida 
(DONEDA, ALMEIDA, 2016): 
This is true for several tools already present in data protection 
legislation that, in some countries, have measures regarding 
transparency and fairness that apply directly to algorithms 
and the platforms that support their functioning. For instance, 
the provision that automated decisions shall be grounded on 
transparent criteria is commonly present in several pieces of 
data-protection legislation. The same happens with the right to 
ask for a human revision of automatically taken decisions.
After analyzing options and limitations on governance, 
researchers at the University of Zurich concluded that there is no one-
size-fits-all solution, but there should be a mix between governance and 
a respect for each actor involved: 
Analyses reveal that there is a broad spectrum of players, 
levels and instruments for the governance of algorithms, but 
there is no one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, there is the need 
for a governance mix consistent with the respective risks and 
applications in question and an interplay between instruments 
and diverse actors involved. The attention therefore has to shift 
to multi-dimensional solutions and combinations of governance 
measures that mutually enable and complement each other. (…) 
The search for an adequate governance mix is difficult because 
there is only limited knowledge about the development and the 
effects of regulatory interventions. The existing uncertainties 
call for further risk and technology assessment to strengthen 
the foundations for evidence-based governance in the domain 
of algorithmic selection. Risk-based approaches seem to be 
4  The author notes that algorithm analysis must always be linked to data analysis: 
“Algorithms are inert, meaningless machines until paired with databases on which 
to function. A sociological inquiry into an algorithm must always grapple with the 
databases to which it is wedded; failing to do so would be akin to what was said at 
a public protest, while failing to notice that some speakers had been stopped at the 
park gates”. 
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particularly appropriate for this purpose. They can monitor 
market and technology developments, assess the involved 
and emerging risks and develop problem-oriented, adaptive 
governance strategies. (SAURWEIN, 2015, p. 44).
However, Lucas Introna (INTRONA, 2016, p. 17-49), a professor 
at the University of Lancaster, believes that the best solution is not 
governance but governmentality. For the author, governance practices 
themselves should be governed because they are never completely safe 
as such. Governmentality, viewed as a meta-governance, would then 
consider the performative nature of governance practices (and their 
outcomes) and show the mutual constitutive nature of problems, domains 
of knowledge, and subjectivities commanded by governance practices. 
Calculative practices would relate to government technologies. They 
are domains of knowledge and expertise. Such practices contain some 
moral authority, as they impose neutrality and objectivity on a domain 
that has moral relevance (the author exemplifies with an algorithm 
designed to identify plagiarism). Based on this, he concludes: 
Thus, understanding governing practices in the idiom of 
governmentality allows us to see how problems, technologies 
of governance, regimes of knowledge, and subjectivities 
become mutually constitutive of each other to create a regime 
of government that has no specific essence (location or unified 
action). All the performative outcomes are “never simply a 
realization of a programme, strategy or intention: whilst the will 
to govern traverses them, they are not simply realizations of any 
simple will”. (INTRONA, 2016, p. 39).
Nicholas Diakopoulos has another approach in dealing with 
algorithm related responsibility. He argues that the crucial point is 
autonomous decision making, since decisions made by algorithms can 
be based on heuristics5:
Algorithmic decisions can be based on heuristics and rules, 
or calculations over massive amounts of data. Rules may be 
articulated directly by programmers or be dynamic and flexible 
based on machine learning of data. Sometimes a human operator 
maintains agency and makes the final decision in a process, but 
even in this case the algorithm biases the operator’s attention 
toward a subset of information (DIAKOPOULOS, 2015, p. 
400).
Within this logic of results based on bias, it is also important to 
highlight that the algorithms are programmed to classify the data sent to 
5   Heuristics is a method or process created with the goal of finding solutions to a 
problem.
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them and, often, mistakes can be made, and there may be false positives 
and false negatives. As Diakopoulos exemplifies (DIAKOPOULOS, 
2015, P. 401), YouTube rates the videos submitted to the site according 
to the songs that are played to check for copyright infringement. A false 
positive, in this case, would be a video classified as infringing, but 
which, in fact, fits into a fair use hypothesis. A false negative, in turn, 
would be a video classified as fair use, but that, in practice, violated 
copyright.
Considering that algorithms exert power by themselves but are 
always influenced by human beings who created them, Diakopoulos 
states that liability must consider the intention of the creators of the 
algorithm, the process that influenced its design, and the agency that 
interprets the algorithms that generated results (DIAKOPOULOS, 2015, 
P. 398)6. Relevant to this discussion, the teachings of Nick Bostrom, a 
philosopher at the University of Oxford, and Eliezer Yudkowsky, co-
founder of the Machine Intelligence Research Institute: 
Another important social criterion for transactions in 
organizations is to be able to find the person responsible for 
getting something done. When an AI system fails in its assigned 
tasks, who is to blame? The programmers? The end users? 
Modern bureaucrats often take refuge in established procedures 
that widely distribute liability, so that a person cannot be 
identified or blamed for the outcome of catastrophes (HOWARD, 
1994). The likely disinterested trial of a specialist system could 
turn out to be an even better refuge. Even if an AI system is 
designed with a user replacement, it is a must to consider the 
career incentive of a bureaucrat who will be personally blamed 
if the replacement goes wrong, and who would much rather 
blame the AI for any difficult decision with a negative result. 
(BOSTROM; YUDKOWSKY , 2011, p. 202-203).
This leads us to further discuss the moral and legal liability of 
these non-human agents (KNIGHT, 2017)7. To think about regulation, 
6  “Algorithmic accountability must therefore consider algorithms as objects of human 
creation and take into account intent, including that of any group or institutional 
processes that may have influenced their design, as well as the agency of human 
actors in interpreting the output of algorithms in the course of making higher level 
decisions.”
7  This discussion complements the governance review and touches upon 
the areas of Machine & Information Ethics & Philosophy of Technology. 
Another possible nomenclature for these issues is Digital Ethics: “Digital 
ethics is the branch of ethics that studies and evaluates moral problems 
related to data, algorithms and corresponding practices. Its goal is to 
formulate and support morally good solutions (e.g. right conducts or right 
values) by developing three lines of research: the ethics of data, the ethics 
of algorithms and the ethics of practices. The ethics of data looks at the 
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it is crucial to go beyond the mere recognition of the agency power of 
Things and seek a careful analysis of the differences between technical 
artifacts and sociotechnical systems. This differentiation is justified by 
the level of complexity and potential of influence of each one, leading 
to different regulations.
Peter-Paul Verbeek in Moralizing Technology: Understanding 
and Designing the Morality of Things aims to broaden the scope of 
ethics to better accommodate the technological age, and in doing so, 
reveals the inseparable nature of humanity and technology. For Verbeek, 
technologies are “moral mediators” that shape the way we perceive and 
interact with the world and thus reveal and guide possible behaviors. 
In Verbeek’s words: “No technology is morally neutral, since every 
technology always affects the way in which we perceive and interact 
with the world, and even the ways in which we think – it mediates our 
lives.” (VERBEEK, 2011).
Referring to Bruno Latour’s theory, Verbeek concludes that 
humanistic ethics necessarily divide the world into two domains: the 
human on one side and the other (or the “non-human”), where human 
beings are subjects and non-humans are objects of human activity. 
Due to this approach, it becomes almost impossible to attribute any 
moral significance to technology. For this reason, our starting point is 
the scenario presented by Latour, according to which artifacts are also 
social actors. According to Latour (LATOUR, 2001, p. 245):
To conceive humanity and technology as opposing poles is, in 
effect, to discard mankind: we are sociotechnical animals and 
every human interaction is sociotechnical. We are never limited 
to social bonds. We never confront ourselves with objects 
alone. […] The illusion of modernity was to believe that the 
more we grow, the more objectivity and subjectivity grow apart, 
thus creating a radically different future from our past. After 
the paradigm shift in our conception of science and technology, 
we now know that this will never happen and, in fact, never 
happened. […] [The artifacts] deserve to be housed in our 
intellectual culture as full social actors. The artifacts are us. The 
aim of our philosophy, social theory and morality is to invent 
political institutions capable of absorbing this great history, this 
vast spiraling movement, this labyrinth, this fate. 
generation, recording, curation, processing, dissemination, sharing and 
use of data. It is concerned with moral problems posed by the collection, 
analysis and application of large data sets. Issues range from the use of big 
data in biomedical research and the social sciences to profiling, advertising 
and data donation and data philanthropy, as well as open data in government 
projects”.
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From Latour’s teachings, it is possible to deduce that artifacts 
are endowed with agency and have the capacity to interfere and, for 
this reason, they must be considered full-fledged social actors. As with 
sociotechnical systems, on an even larger scale, justified by its greater 
complexity, as will be further explored in this article. 
Although Latour’s theory explores the role that each actor 
possesses, placing all of them on the same level of agency, it is important 
to consider that it is not all technical artifacts or sociotechnical systems 
that have the same capacity for influence in the interactions that occur 
between humans and non-humans. For example, the influence that a 
physical door holds in relation to an individual is considerably different 
from the influence generated by a Thing endowed with artificial 
intelligence and algorithms with deep learning technique. (WEB 
FOUNDATION, 2017)8
The technical artifacts, as explained by the Dutch theorist Peter 
Kroes, can be understood as man-made Things (objects), which have a 
function and a plan of use (KROES, 2011, pp. 1-2 e 5-7). They consist 
of products obtained through technological action, designating the 
attitudes we take daily to solve practical problems, including those 
related to our desires and our needs (KROES, 2011, pp. 1-2 e 5-7). 
Technical artifacts involve the need for rules of use to be observed, as 
well as for parameters to be created in relation to the roles of individuals 
and social institutions in relation to them and their use (KROES, 2011).
As explained by Kroes (KROES, 2011): 
Practical problems are not just resolved by introducing a bunch 
of technical artifacts into the world. With these artifacts come 
instructions for their use. And with these technical artifacts 
come also social roles for people and social institutions for 
enabling the use of the artifacts.
[…]
There is a huge variety of technical artifacts from very small to 
very big, from simple to complex, from component part to end-
product and consisting of chemical materials, et cetera. What all 
of these things have in common is that they are material objects 
that have been deliberately produced by humans in order to 
fulfil some kind of practical function. They are often described 
8  “Deep learning is a subset of machine learning in which the tasks are broken down 
and distributed onto machine learning algorithms that are organized in consecutive 
layers. Each layer builds up on the output from the previous layer. Together the 
layers constitute an artificial neural network that mimics the distributed approach to 
problem-solving carried out by neurons in a human brain.” 
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as technical artifacts in order to emphasize that they are not 
naturally occurring objects.
[…]
We may therefore define a technical artifact as a physical object 
with a technical function and use plan designed and made by 
human beings. The requirement that the object must be designed 
and made by humans is added to ensure that any natural objects 
that happen to be used for practical purposes are not also 
termed technical artifacts. Those differences relate especially 
to the status of having a function and a use plan, and to the 
accompanying possibility of making normative assertions.
Technical artifacts, therefore, are specific objects (Things) with 
their own characteristics. Works of art, for instance, are not synonymous 
with technical artifacts. While these are man-made with clear practical 
objectives, those have no concrete utility and the skills required for 
their production are different from those required by engineers.  Natural 
objects are also not to be confused with technical artifacts, since they 
are given by nature and do not have, in themselves, a practical function. 
However, natural objects can be transformed into technical artifacts if 
they go through a process of man-made transformation. For example, 
the wood of the trunk of a tree is something of nature but becomes a 
technical artifact when it is transformed by man into a closet and gains 
a concrete function.
Finally, technical artifacts are distinguished by two main points 
from the mere physical objects, and from the biological objects. First, 
they have a clear function and usage plan. Second, they are subject to an 
evaluation analysis as to whether they are good or bad and whether they 
work or not. (KROES, 2011, p. 7-13). Thus, it is possible to observe 
the great importance that the function and the plan of use have in the 
characterization of a technical artifact. These two characteristics are 
intimately connected with the goals that the individuals who created the 
object seek with it, so that they do not stray from the intended purposes.
Faced with this inseparability, the questioning of the morality 
of human objectives and actions extends to the morality of technical 
artifacts (KROES, 2011). Technology can be used to change the world 
around us and individuals’ have goals – be them private and / or 
social – that can be achieved with the help of these technical artifacts. 
Considering that the objectives sought by the humans when creating a 
technical artifact are not separated from the characteristics of the object 
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itself, we can conclude that the technical artifacts have an intrinsically 
moral character.9
This is an important point to which attention should be given, 
since the debate about liability for consequences arising from the action 
of human created objects is still a controversial point: who would be 
held liable? The human or the object? We will return to this discussion 
later, soon after conceptualizing sociotechnical systems.
Therefore, alongside the technical artifacts, which can represent 
the simplest objects, with little capacity for interaction/influence, to the 
more technologically complex ones, we have the sociotechnical systems, 
which consist of a Network (embedding itself in the Latour’s concept 
reflected in actor-network theory) that connects humans and Things, 
thus possessing greater capacity for interaction and unpredictability.
For a regulatory analysis, this concept is even more fundamental 
(KROES, 2011). Precisely because of its complexity embodied in 
a conglomerate of actants, causing socio-technical systems to have 
even less predictable consequences than those generated by technical 
artifacts. In addition, they generate a greater difficulty to prevent 
unintended consequences, and to hold agents liable in case of harm, 
since the “technological action”, reflected in the sociotechnical system, 
is a sum of actions of actants’ entanglement in the Network in an intra-
relation.
To illustrate the difference between the concepts of technical 
artifact and sociotechnical system, we can think of the former being 
represented by an airplane, and the second by the complex aviation 
system. The sociotechnical system is formed by the set of interrelated 
agents (human and non-human actants - Things, institutions, etc.) that 
work together to achieve a given goal. The materiality and effects of a 
sociotechnical system depend on the sum of the agency of each actant. 
However, there are parameters of how the system should be used, which 
means that these systems have pre-defined operational processes and 
can be affected by regulatory laws and policies.
Thus, when a tragic accident involving an airplane occurs, it is 
necessary to analyze what was in the sphere of control and influence 
of each actor and technical artifact components of the Sociotechnical 
Network, but quite possibly we will observe a very complex and 
9   There is a rich debate among scholars about whether certain elements such as 
conscience, free will, spontaneity, creativity and the role of reason constitute a 
necessary condition for the recognition of a moral agent (like the human agent).
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symbiotic relationship between the components that led to this fateful 
result (SARAIVA, 2011). Moreover, this result is often unpredictable, 
due to the autonomy of the system based on an agency diffused and 
distributed among all components (actants) (LO, 2013).10
According to M. C. Elish, from Columbia University (ELISH, 
2016):
It is common to see an airline representative at the gate of a 
canceled flight be yelled at by frustrated travelers, even though 
he neither caused the cancelation nor possesses the power to 
change it. On the front lines of large, bureaucratic systems, 
people positioned as the external interface of a system appear 
at once a metonym for the company and also as gatekeepers to 
the company. As gatekeepers, they seem to possess a degree of 
agency, a capacity to take effective action, which the customer 
does not. But in general, we know that such individuals do not 
represent the whole company, and that agency is only perceived, 
not actuated. We know, in most cases, these individuals are not 
responsible for the decisions that have led up to the situation. 
In instances like these, humans at the interface between 
customer and company are like sponges, soaking up the excess 
of emotions that flood the interaction but cannot be absorbed 
by faceless bureaucracy or an inanimate object. There may 
be affective ramifications for this misplaced blame, but the 
discerning customer or manager will know that the individual 
is not responsible. However, in automated or robotic systems 
it can be difficult to accurately locate who is responsible when 
agency is distributed in a system and control over an action is 
mediated through time and space. When humans and machines 
work together, who or what is in control? As control has become 
distributed across multiple actors (human and nonhuman), our 
social and legal conceptions of responsibility have remained 
generally about an individual. We developed the term moral 
crumple zone to describe the result of this ambiguity within 
systems of distributed control, particularly automated and 
autonomous systems. Just as the crumple zone in a car is 
designed to absorb the force of impact in a crash, the human in 
a highly complex and automated system may become simply a 
component – accidentally or intentionally – that bears the brunt 
of the moral and legal responsibilities when the overall system 
malfunctions.
10 Academics and companies have researched the vulnerabilities of the aviation 
industry by trying to propose a solution that involves clustered aircrafts, where 
one group of aircrafts share information and validate each other’s transmissions, so 
that they form a group of “reliable aircrafts”. This way, any false signal would be 
rejected by the group. These solutions are trying to add more layers of protection 
over existing technology, minimizing risks such as the hacking of an aircraft. These 
solutions are based on a perspective that sees not only airplanes as isolated technical 
artifacts but considering solutions that involve the sociotechnical system more 
broadly. 
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Considering these complex systems, the debate on liability and 
ethics – already raised when presenting technical artifacts - returns. 
Issues such as the liability of developers and the existence of morality 
in non-human actors – with a focus here on technological objects - need 
a response or, at least, reflections that contribute to the debate in the 
public sphere11.
Bruno Latour’s theory offers progress in confronting and 
discarding the formal binary division between humans and non-
humans, but it places objects with complexities and objects with 
different values at the same level. Given this context, from a legal 
and regulatory point of view, assigning a different status to technical 
artifacts and sociotechnical systems, according to their capacity for 
agency and influence is justifiable and should be endowed with different 
moral status and level of liability. It is necessary, then, to distinguish 
the influence and importance that each Thing has in the Network and, 
above all, in the public sphere and, from there, to think about what can 
be done in the IoT scenario, from an ethical-regulatory point of view 
(LATOUR, 2001, P. 245).
For this analysis, we will focus on advanced algorithms with 
machine learning, and on robots equipped with artificial intelligence, 
considering that they are technical artifacts (Things) attached to 
sociotechnical systems with a greater potential for autonomy (based 
largely on the processing of Big Data) and unpredictability.
While technical artifacts, such as a chair or a glass, are artifacts 
“domesticated” by humans, i.e. more predictable in terms of their 
influence and agency power, it is possible to affirm that intelligent 
algorithms and robots are still non-domesticated technologies, since the 
time of interaction with man throughout history has not yet allowed us 
to foresee most of the risks in order to control them, or to cease them 
altogether. This clipping will allow us to work on the ethical theme of 
Things, in its most complex aspect.
Colin Allen e Wendell Wallach (WALLACH, ALLEN, 2008) 
argue that as intelligent Things, like robots,12 become more autonomous 
11   In its Habermas definition. 
12 The 2005 UN Robotics Report defines a robot as a semi or fully autonomous 
reprogrammable machine used for the well-being of human beings in manufacturing 
operations or services.
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and assume more responsibility, they must be programmed with moral 
decision-making skills for our own safety.13
Corroborating this thesis, Peter-Paul Verbeek (VERBEEK, 
2001), while dealing with the morality of Things understands that: as 
machines (VLADECK, 2017) now operate more frequently in open 
social environments, such as connected public spheres, it becomes 
increasingly important to design a type of functional morality that is 
sensitive to ethically relevant characteristics and applicable to intended 
situations. With respect to which type of ethics to implement, it 
is defended that it must be a deontological matrix type, constructed 
within the deliberative procedural parameters defended by Habermas, 
but also considering the agency power of Things in a new-materialist 
perspective.
A good example is the Microsoft’s robot Tay (REVISTA 
GALILEU, 2017), that helps to illustrate the effects that a non-human 
element can have on society. In 2016, Microsoft launched an Artificial 
Intelligence program named Tay. Endowed with a deep learning 
ability, the robot shaped its world view based on online interactions 
with other people and producing authentic expressions based on them. 
The experience, however, proved to be disastrous and the company had 
to deactivate the tool in less than 24 hours due to the production of 
worrying results (TECHNOBLOG, 2017).
The goal was to get Tay to interact with human users on Twitter, 
learning human patterns of conversation. It turns out that in less than 
a day, the chatbot was generating utterly inappropriate comments, 
including racist, sexist and anti-semitic publications. In 2015, a similar 
case occurred with “Google Photos”. This was a program that also 
learned from users, to tag photos. However, their results were also 
unpleasant, and it was noticed, for example, that the bot was labeling 
colored people as gorillas (TECMUNDO, 2017). 
The implementation of programs capable of “learning” to 
perform functions that relate to people creates new ethical and regulatory 
challenges, since it increases the possibility of obtaining results other 
than those intended or even totally unexpected. In addition, these results 
can cause harm to other actors, such as the discriminatory offenses 
generated by Tay and Google Photos.
13 Researchers at Delft University of Technology and Eindhoven University of 
Technology say that the values  that should be taken into account in the development 
of these technologies are: health, safety, sustainability and privacy.
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Particularly, the use of artificial intelligence tools that interact 
through social media requires reflection on the ethical requirements 
that must accompany the development of this type of technology. This 
is because, as previously argued, these mechanisms also act as agents 
in society, and end up influencing the environment around them, even 
though they are non-human elements. It is not, therefore, a matter of 
thinking only about the “use” and “repair” of new technologies, but 
mainly about the proper ethical orientation for their development 
(WOLF, 2017). 
Microsoft argued that Tay’s malfunctioning was the result 
of an attack by users who exploited a vulnerability in their program. 
However, for Wolf et al (WOLF, 2017), this does not exempt them from 
the responsibility of considering the occurrence of possible harmful 
consequences with the use of this type of software. For the authors, 
the fact that the creators did not expect this outcome is part of the very 
unpredictable nature of this type of system.
The attempt to make Artificial Intelligence systems increasingly 
adaptable and capable of acting in a human-like manner, makes them 
present less predictable behaviors. Thus, they begin to act not only as 
tools that perform pre-established functions in the various fields in 
which they are employed, but also to develop a proper way of acting. 
They impact the world in a way that is less determinable or controllable 
by human agents. It is worth emphasizing that algorithms can adjust 
to give rise to new algorithms and new ways to accomplish their tasks 
(DOMINGOS, 2015)14, so that the way the result was achieved would be 
difficult to explain even to the programmers who created the algorithm 
(DONEDA; ALMEIDA, 2016, p. 60). 
Also, the more adaptable the artificial intelligence programs 
become, the more unpredictable are their actions, bringing new risks. 
This makes it necessary for developers of this type of program to be 
more aware of the ethical responsibilities involved in this activity. 
The Code of Ethics of the Association for Computing Machinery 
(WOLF, 2017) indicates that professionals in the field should develop 
14  Pedro Domingos, on learning algorithms: “Every algorithm has an input and an 
output: the data goes into the computer, the algorithm does what it will with it, and 
out comes the result. Machine learning turns this around: in goes the data and the 
desired result and out comes the algorithm that turns one into the other. Learning 
algorithms—also known as learners—are algorithms that make other algorithms. 
With machine learning, computers write their own programs, so we don’t have to”.
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“comprehensive and thorough assessments of computer systems and 
their impacts, including the analysis of possible risks”.
In addition, there is a need for dedicated monitoring to verify 
the actions taken by such a program, especially in the early stages of 
its implementation. In the Tay case, developers should have monitored 
the behavior of the bot intensely within the first 24 hours of its launch, 
which is not known to have occurred (WOLF, 2017).
Furthermore, there is no way to determine with certainty what 
motivated Microsoft to remove the program: whether the production 
of offensive comments or the negative response received from users 
regarding the program. Nevertheless, the logic should be to prevent 
possible damages and to monitor in advance, rather than the remediation 
of losses, especially when they may be unforeseeable. To limit the 
possibilities of negative consequences, software developers must 
recognize those potentially dangerous and unpredictable programs 
and restrict their possibilities of interaction with the public until it 
is intensively tested in a controlled environment. After this stage, 
consumers should be informed about the vulnerabilities of a program 
that is essentially unpredictable, and the possible consequences of 
unexpected behavior (WOLF, 2017).
Another case15 involving artificial intelligence occurred in 
November 2016, when Google Translator developed its own language 
unintelligible to humans. A few months earlier, Google had installed 
the Google Neural Machine Translation system, which would learn to 
translate based on examples and achieve great accuracy in its task. The 
mechanism would have been programmed to translate certain languages 
for English. However, the system managed to translate languages 
directly with no interference, which means that the artificial intelligence 
system would have developed its own language, an interlanguage 
(SUMARES, 2016).
15 Another interesting case that helps us think about the autonomy of these agents 
is the creation and adoption of Tinder. It is estimated that it amasses a total of 50 
million users. This platform intermediates encounters between different people 
who seek to connect with one another. Therefore, even relationships considered 
more intimate are engendered and made possible using applications like Tinder. 
In fact, the algorithm that supports the program is responsible for “deciding” who 
will appear to whom, based on criteria unknown to the users. Thus, interactions 
among registered people are established and influenced using the program code 
and algorithmic filtering, so that this - non-human - element influences these 
relationships.
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A similar situation occurred recently with artificial intelligence 
developed by Facebook. The system would have been created so that 
Bob and Alice - names given to bots created by researchers - simulated 
negotiations in English to help researchers understand more constructive 
forms of negotiation. Nevertheless, Bob and Alice understood each 
other better by using unintelligible sentences for humans, and so they 
reached agreements faster. The system was deactivated and did not 
generate positive results for the research (ROBERTSON, 2017).
As can be seen from these examples - which tend to multiply -, 
the use of technology, with an emphasis on artificial intelligence, can 
cause unpredictable and uncontrollable consequences, so that often 
the only solution is to deactivate the system. Therefore, the increase 
in autonomy and complexity of the technical artifacts is evident, given 
that they are endowed with an increased agency, and are capable 
of influencing others but also of being influenced in the network 
in a significant way, often composing even more autonomous and 
unpredictable sociotechnical systems.
Although there is no artificial intelligence system that is 
completely autonomous, with the development of technology, it is 
possible to create machines that will have the ability to make decisions 
in an increasingly independent way, which raises questions about 
who would be responsible for the result of its actions and for eventual 
damages caused to others (VLADECK, 2014, p. 120-121). (CERKA, 
2015, p. 376-389) According to the Report released at the World 
Economic Forum in 2017 (WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, 2018): The 
greatest threat to humanity lies in delegating authority and decisions to 
machines that do not have the intelligence to make.
The ability to amass experiences and learn from massive data 
processing, coupled with the ability to act independently and make 
choices autonomously can be considered preconditions for legal 
liability. However, since artificial intelligence is not recognized today 
as a subject of law, it cannot be held individually liable for the potential 
damage it may cause (CERKA, 2015). In this sense, according to 
Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic 
Communications in International Contracts, a person (natural or an 
entity) on behalf of whom a program was created must, ultimately, be 
liable for any action generated by the machine. This reasoning is based 
on the notion that a tool has no will of its own (CERKA, 2015).
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On the other hand, in the case of damage caused by acts of 
an artificial intelligence, another type of responsibility is the one that 
makes an analogy with the responsibility attributed to the parents by the 
actions of their children (strict vicarious liability). Thus, adopting the 
theory of “robots as tools”, the responsibility for the acts of an AI could 
fall on its producer, users or their programmers, responsible for their 
“training” (SOMBRA; REGOTO, 2018)16. (CERKA, 2015, p. 376-389)
Another possibility is the model that focuses on the ability 
of programmers or users to predict the potential for these crimes to 
occur. According to this second model, a person can be held liable for 
an offense if it represents a natural and probable consequence of that 
person’s conduct. It only requires that the programmer or user acted 
deceitfully or has been negligent (ANDREWS, p. 552) considering a 
result that would be predictable. (HALLEVY, 2010)
Furthermore, regarding civil liability, George S. Cole refers to 
four types: (i) product liability, (ii) service liability, (iii) malpractice, 
and (iv) negligence. (COLE, 1990) The author argues that product 
liability is, at best, only partially applicable. The basic elements for 
its applicability would be: (i) the AI  should be a “product”; (ii) the 
defendant must be an AI seller; (iii) The AI must reach the injured party 
without substantive change; (iv) the AI  must be defective; and (v) the 
defect shall be the source of the damage. Hence the service liability 
would be, in the view of the author, better applied, but not well defined. 
16  The problem with this approach is that Things start to train itself without needing 
human input. The evolution of this feature usually has the following narrative: 
“Just over 20 years ago, in 1997, chess champion Garry Kasparov lost his reign to 
the Deep Blue supercomputer. If in 1997 Deep Blue made history, in 2017 it was 
the turn of another supercomputer, the Alpha Go Zero, that won several human 
adversaries in the complex game “Go”. In fact, since its previous version, Alpha 
Go had been dominating the headlines by successively winning Go’s best players, 
largely because of its ability to gather data from its opponents and learn from 
matches played so far. The results obtained by Alpha Go Zero are relevant because it 
comes from an artificial intelligence technique called reinforcement learning, which 
is only possible due to the ability to store, process and analyze data, habits and 
tactics of the players. It is a technique in which, when trying different approaches 
to a problem, the computer learns the best solution, without, however, needing any 
programming or previous teaching by a human. In this way, the computer becomes 
capable of doing things without any programmer having to teach it beforehand. 
Alpha Go Zero has been trained only from its own experience with the personal data 
management of players and matches, which allows it to surpass human capabilities 
and operate in areas where humans are lacking. In the same sense, the newest 
version of the AlphaZero supercomputer, also through the reinforcement learning 
technique, dominated the game in just four hours after being programmed with the 
rules of chess (without any strategies), having been able to defeat the best chess 
computer program until then, the Stockfish.”. 
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(COLE, 1990) On the other hand, the author maintains that applying 
the malpractice liability, in turn, has great potential.17 Thus, the decision 
would lie between strict liability and negligence. The standard, in this 
case, should be set by the professional community. (COLE, 1990)
Still, as the field develops, for Cole, the negligence model would 
be the most applicable. However, it can be difficult to implement, 
especially when some errors are unpredictable or even unavoidable. 
To date, the courts have not yet formulated a clear definition of the 
responsibility involved in creating AIs which, if not undertaken, should 
lead to negligent liability. (COLE, 1990)
Should an act of an Artificial Intelligence cause damages by 
reason of deceit or negligence, manufacturing defect or design failure 
as a result of blameworthy programming, existing liability rules would 
most often indicate the “fault” of its creators. However, it is often not 
easy to know how these programs come to their conclusions or even 
lead to unexpected and possibly unpleasant consequences. This harmful 
potential is especially dangerous in the use of Artificial Intelligence 
programs that rely on machine learning and deep learning mechanisms, 
in which the very nature of the software involves the intention of 
developing an action that is not predictable, and which will only be 
determined from the data processing of all the information with which 
the program had contact.
Scientists from different areas are concerned and deliberate 
that conferring this autonomous “thinking” ability to machines can 
necessarily give them the ability to act contrary to the rules they are 
given (PAGALLO, 2013); (VLADECK, 2014, p. 120-121). Hence the 
importance of taking into consideration and investigating the spheres of 
control and influence of designers and other agents during the creation 
and functional development of technical artifacts.18 19
17  Because the text was produced in 1990, the author states that the model of 
malpractice liability would not yet apply because programming was not officially 
a profession. However, this concept must be updated, since today this profession is 
widely recognized.
18  Accordingly, some relevant concerns are raised: Would it be possible hold liable the 
companies that designed, programmed, or manufactured the machine, even if they 
had included programming rules that would prevent harmful behavior to humans? 
Should creators be totally blamed whenever something goes wrong, even when 
projected machines “self-teach”? In that case, would the damage-causing conduct 
already prove defective? Or would one adopt a theory that values the subject’s 
economic position for accountability, that creators are in a better position to absorb 
the cost of harm than the person harmed?
19 The engineers are responsible for thinking about the values that will go into the 
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Often, during the design phase, the consequences are 
indeterminate because they depend partly on the actions of other factors 
and agents besides the designers. Also, since making a decision can be 
a complex process, it may be difficult for a human to even explain it. It 
may be difficult, further, to prove that the product containing the AI was 
defective, and especially that the defect already existed at the time of its 
production20. (CERKA, 2015, p. 376-389)
As the behavior of an AI is not totally predictable, and its 
behavior is the result of the interaction between several human and non-
human agents that make up the sociotechnical system and even of self-
learning processes, it can be extremely difficult to determine the causal 
nexus (JUSBRASIL, 2018) between the damage caused and the action 
of a human being or legal entity. (MULHOLLAND, 2010).21
design of the artifacts, their function and their use manual. What escapes from the 
design and use manual does not depend on the control and influence of the engineer 
and can be unpredictable. That’s why engineers must design value-sensitive technical 
artifacts. An artifact sensitive to constitutionally guaranteed values (deliberate in the 
public sphere) is a liable artifact.
20 With this regard, to enhance the transparency and the possibility of accountability 
in this techno-regulated context, there is nowadays a growing movement in civil 
society demanding the development of “explainable artificial intelligences”. Also, 
the debate around a “right to explanation” for algorithmic and autonomous decisions 
that took place on discussions around the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) is also a way to achieve the goals of transparency and accountability since 
algorithms are taking more critical decisions on our behalf and is increasingly hard 
to explain and understand its processes.
21 Caitlin Sampaio Mulholland addressed the problem of distributed irresponsibility (the 
name attributed in the present work to refer to the effect of the lack of identification 
of the causal nexus between the agent’s conduct and the harm produced) in her 
theory of causality presumption. Caitlin Mulholland, in her analysis, addresses 
the scenario of lack of clarity in the causal nexus between agents reinforcing the 
concept of “alternative causality”. The concept of alternative causality allows 
us to identify that the damage was caused by a single behavior that, due to the 
cohesive characteristic of the group, remains impossible to attest. The objective of 
this liability is to seek reimbursement from the victim, assuming the causal nexus. 
According to Mulholland: “If there are several activities, each of which alone would 
have been sufficient to produce the damage, but in which uncertainty persists as to 
what caused it, each will be considered as the cause of the damage limited to the 
corresponding probability of having caused it “. (...) There is a single causal nexus 
that cannot be directly identified. Hence their presumption in relation to the group. 
(...) What is sought with the alternative causality is to enable the repair of damages 
caused by facilitating the burden of proof. Instead of having to prove that a person 
through his conduct has caused the damage that has afflicted it, he may rely on 
the presumption of causality, suffice it to prove that he has suffered damages and 
that the damage was the consequence of a certain activity performed by a certain 
group”. Mulholland’s argument goes beyond the cases of: (a) joint liability of the 
accused; (b) liability attributed according to the causal contribution of each agent to 
obtain the harmful result; (c) the liability attributed to only one of the agents, when 
it is possible to identify the rupture of the causal nexus between successive actions. 
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According to the legal framework we have today, this can lead 
to a situation of “distributed irresponsibility” (the name attributed in 
the present work to refer to the possible effect resulting from the lack 
of identification of the causal nexus between the agent’s conduct and 
the damage caused) among the different actors involved in the process. 
This will occur mainly when the damage transpires within a complex 
sociotechnical system, in which the liability of the intelligent Thing 
itself, or of a natural or legal person, will not be obvious. (UNESCO, 
2017)
As argued by Alan Turing and the Oxford Internet Institute 
(MITTELSTADT, 2016):
The modular design of systems can mean that no single person 
or group can fully grasp the manner in which the system 
will interact or respond to a complex flow of new inputs.’’ 
From traditional, linear programming through to autonomous 
algorithms, behavioural control is gradually transferred from the 
programmer to the algorithm and its operating environment. The 
gap between the designer’s control and algorithm’s behaviour 
creates an accountability gap wherein blame can potentially be 
assigned to several moral agents simultaneously.
Corroborating this thesis, according to the recent UNESCO 
Report (UNESCO, 2017) on “robotics ethics”:
The rapid development of highly intelligent autonomous robots, 
then, is likely to challenge our current classification of beings 
according to their moral status, in the same or maybe even more 
profound way as it happened with non-human animals through 
the animal rights movement. It may even alter the way in 
which human moral status is currently perceived. Although still 
resembling futuristic speculations, questions like these should 
not be dismissed lightly, especially in view of the fact that the 
“human-machine divide” is gradually disappearing and the 
likelihood of future appearance of human-machine or animal-
machine hybrids or cyborgs (robots integrated with biological 
organisms or at least containing some biological components). 
[…] In all of these cases, there seems to be a “shared” or 
“distributed” responsibility between robot designers, engineers, 
programmers, manufacturers, investors, sellers and users. 
None of these agents can be indicated as the ultimate source 
When we think, however, of the damage caused within sociotechnical systems, we 
have an even more complex application of the casual nexus and liability, since we 
are often talking about the action caused by a sum of agencies of human beings, 
institutions and intelligent things with autonomy and agency power. In this case, 
the focus on the economic group, despite being able to respond to various damage 
cases, may not be enough for the fair allocation of liability in the IoT era and for 
strong artificial intelligence.
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of action. At the same time, this solution tends to dilute the 
notion of responsibility altogether: if everybody has a part in 
the total responsibility, no one is fully responsible. This problem 
is known as the “problem of the many hands”. […] Robots may 
be used for purposes intended by their designers, but they may 
also be used for a variety of other purposes, especially if their 
“behaviour” can be “hacked” or “reprogrammed” by their end-
users. Robots might have implications far beyond the intentions 
of their developers. It is impossible for roboticists to predict 
entirely how their work might affect society.
Another interesting point worth considering in this context is 
that flaws are natural and can be considered desirable for the faster 
improvement of a technical artifact. Therefore, a regulatory scenario 
that would extinguish all and any flaws or damages would be uncalled 
for. The ideal regulatory scenario would guide the development of the 
technical artifacts and manage it from a perspective of fundamental 
rights protection.
No reliable answers have yet been found on how to deal with the 
potential damages that may arise due to programming errors, or even 
due to machine learning processes that end up incorporating undesired 
conducts into the behavior of the machine that were not predicted by 
developers (HUNT, 2016). Therefore, establishing minimum ethical 
foundations for regulating purposes is just as important as developing 
these new technologies. 
When dealing with Artificial Intelligence, it is essential  to 
promote an extensive debate about the ethical guidelines that should 
guide the construction of these machines. After all, there is a strong 
growth of this segment of scientific research (ECONOMIA IG, 2017)22, 
regulatory scenario included. However, clear parameters of how 
to conduct this study, from the point of view of ethics, has yet to be 
defined. The need to establish a regulatory framework for this type of 
technology has been highlighted by some initiatives.
A conference was held in January 2017 in Asilomar (FUTURE 
OF LIFE, 2017), CA, aiming to establish the definitions of a series of 
22  Recently, “Alpha Go”, an Artificial Intelligence developed by Google defeated for 
the second time the Chinese champion of the Chinese board game Go, considered 
one of the most difficult strategy games ever created. Just to have a dimension of the 
complexity of the game, Go has around 2.1 × 10 possible positions on a board, while 
Chess admits a number of legal positions that is between the orders of magnitude 10 
and 10. As a comparison, it is estimated that in the universe there are no more than 
10 protons. 
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principles so that the development of Artificial Intelligence programs 
can be beneficial. The 23 principles are:
1) Research Goal: The goal of AI research should be to create 
not undirected intelligence, but beneficial intelligence. 
2) Research Funding: Investments in AI should be accompanied 
by funding for research on ensuring its beneficial use, including 
thorny questions in computer science, economics, law, ethics, 
and social studies, such as:
How can we make future AI systems highly robust, so that they 
do what we want without malfunctioning or getting hacked?
How can we grow our prosperity through automation while 
maintaining people’s resources and purpose?
How can we update our legal systems to be more fair and 
efficient, to keep pace with AI, and to manage the risks 
associated with AI?
What set of values should AI be aligned with, and what legal 
and ethical status should it have?
3) Science-Policy Link: There should be constructive and 
healthy exchange between AI researchers and policy-makers.
4) Research Culture: A culture of cooperation, trust, and 
transparency should be fostered among researchers and 
developers of AI.
5) Race Avoidance: Teams developing AI systems should 
actively cooperate to avoid corner-cutting on safety standards.
6) Safety: AI systems should be safe and secure throughout 
their operational lifetime, and verifiably so where applicable 
and feasible.
7) Failure Transparency: If an AI system causes harm, it should 
be possible to ascertain why.
8) Judicial Transparency: Any involvement by an autonomous 
system in judicial decision-making should provide a satisfactory 
explanation auditable by a competent human authority.
9) Responsibility: Designers and builders of advanced AI 
systems are stakeholders in the moral implications of their use, 
misuse, and actions, with a responsibility and opportunity to 
shape those implications.
10) Value Alignment: Highly autonomous AI systems should 
be designed so that their goals and behaviors can be assured to 
align with human values throughout their operation.
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11) Human Values: AI systems should be designed and operated 
so as to be compatible with ideals of human dignity, rights, 
freedoms, and cultural diversity.
12) Personal Privacy: People should have the right to access, 
manage and control the data they generate, given AI systems’ 
power to analyze and utilize that data.
13) Liberty and Privacy: The application of AI to personal data 
must not unreasonably curtail people’s real or perceived liberty.
14) Shared Benefit: AI technologies should benefit and empower 
as many people as possible.
15) Shared Prosperity: The economic prosperity created by AI 
should be shared broadly, to benefit all of humanity.
16) Human Control: Humans should choose how and whether to 
delegate decisions to AI systems, to accomplish human-chosen 
objectives.
17) Non-subversion: The power conferred by control of highly 
advanced AI systems should respect and improve, rather than 
subvert, the social and civic processes on which the health of 
society depends.
18) AI Arms Race: An arms race in lethal autonomous weapons 
should be avoided.
19) Capability Caution: There being no consensus, we should 
avoid strong assumptions regarding upper limits on future AI 
capabilities.
20) Importance: Advanced AI could represent a profound 
change in the history of life on Earth and should be planned for 
and managed with commensurate care and resources.
21) Risks: Risks posed by AI systems, especially catastrophic 
or existential risks, must be subject to planning and mitigation 
efforts commensurate with their expected impact.
22) Recursive Self-Improvement: AI systems designed to 
recursively self-improve or self-replicate in a manner that could 
lead to rapidly increasing quality or quantity must be subject to 
strict safety and control measures.
23) Common Good: Superintelligence should only be developed 
in the service of widely shared ethical ideals, and for the benefit 
of all humanity rather than one state or organization”. 
As drawn from the text’s responsibility section, designers and 
builders of advanced AI systems are considered stakeholders in the 
moral implications of their use, misuse, and actions of the Thing and its 
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damaging autonomous actions, with a responsibility and opportunity to 
shape these implications.
Additionally, the responsibility/liability of the designer should 
also be considered, coupled with the concern in guaranteeing values 
such as privacy, safety and ethics in the design of the artifacts. This 
aims to avoid problems a posteriori. But we have always to consider 
what was within the sphere of control and influence of the designer. 
We must think, therefore, of a “value-sensitive design”. As an example, 
we can mention the commands of: “privacy by design”, “security by 
design” and, “ethics by design”. 
The degree of autonomy allotted to the machine must also be 
thought of, determining what degree of autonomy is reasonable and 
where substantial human control should be maintained. The structure 
contained in the table below, produced in the UNESCO (UNESCO, 
2017) study, contains important parameters that help us think about 
these issues, at the same time trying to identify the different agencies 
involved. Although the proposed structure is simple, its implementation 
in terms of assigning responsibility and regulating usage is complex and 
challenging - for scientists and engineers, policy-makers and ethicists. 
Alternatively, on 16 February 2017, the European Parliament 
issued a resolution with recommendations from the European 
Commission on civil law rules in robotics (2015/2103 (INL)). Among 
other issues, the document advocates for the creation of a European 
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agency for robotics and artificial intelligence, to provide the necessary 
technical, ethical and regulatory expertise (CMS LAW NOW, 2017).
The European Parliament also proposed the introduction of 
a specific legal status for smart robots as well as the creation of an 
insurance system or compensatory fund with the aim of creating a 
protection system for the use of intelligent machines. 
Regarding the legal status that could be given to these agents, 
the resolution uses the expression “electronic person” or “e-person”. In 
addition, in view of the discrepancy between ethics and technology, the 
European directive rightly states that dignity, in a deontological bias, 
must be at the center of a new digital ethic.
The attribution of personality to intelligent robots (FAUTH)23 
seems correct and coherent with the gain of autonomy (HUPFER)24 of 
23 The characteristics most used for the foundation of the human personality are: 
consciousness; rationality; autonomy (self-motivated activity); the capacity 
to communicate; and self-awareness. Another possible social criterion is to be 
considered a person whenever society recognizes thus recognizes one (we can 
even apply the Habermasian theory here, through a deliberative process in the 
public sphere). Other theorists believe that the fundamental characteristic for the 
attribution of personality is sensibility, which means the capacity to feel pleasure 
and pain. According to Juliana de Andrade, based on the theory of ‘depersonalized 
entities’, defended by Daniel Lourenço: “Firstly, for us, as seen, the nonhuman 
animal is a sentient being, just like man, and, therefore, must have their interest 
in not suffering as well protected by our legal system - which, in fact, was already 
done by the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution, by prohibiting the practice of 
cruel acts against nonhuman animals. Hence, civilian legislation must adapt to this 
reality and recognize the status of a subject of law of the nonhuman animal”. In 
addition, the Law has already broken a major barrier to the attribution of personality 
by granting personality to legal entities. LOURENÇO, Daniel Braga. Direito dos 
animais: fundamentação e novas perspectivas. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris. 
Ed., 2008, p.141. ANDRADE, Juliana. A natureza jurídica dos animais: rompendo 
com a tradição antropocêntrica.
24 The Kantian moral establishes its foundation in autonomy, whose realization implies 
the necessity of freedom and is characterized by the capacity to think and to act by 
oneself. According to this moral, every human being, as long as he is rational, can 
attain autonomy, that is, give himself the direction for his life. For this realization, 
it is enough that you have the courage to make use of your own understanding, that 
is, of thinking for yourself. It is necessary to remember, however, that for the human 
being to “self-determine”, he needs to live in community. Habermas complements 
this initial Kantian conception. In the words of Haide Maria Hupffer: “Habermas 
advances indicating that autonomy must also be understood as the principle of 
democracy. For Habermas, morality is a process of argumentation between a free 
and autonomous society. The author seeks to reconstruct the internal link between 
popular sovereignty and human rights by introducing the principle of discourse. 
Habermas introduces his way of interpreting the concept of autonomy, based on 
the principle of discourse, that is, autonomy lies in a communicative freedom, 
presupposed in the action that is guided by mutual understanding. For a norm to 
be universal, consensus is necessary, that is, for us to feel that we are the recipients 
of rights, it is necessary to be held as authors of law.”. The importance of bringing 
180
Revista Direitos Culturais | Santo Ângelo | v. 13 | n. 31 | p. 153-190 | set./dez. 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20912/rdc.v13i31.2816
Intelligent Things. In this sense, as argued by professor David Vladeck, 
from George Town University:
One solution would be to reconceptualize these autonomous, 
intelligent machines as entities with the status of a “person” 
under the law. Conferring “personhood” on these machines 
would resolve the agency question; the machines become 
principals in their own right, and along with new legal status 
would come new legal burdens, including the burden of self-
insurance. This is a different form of cost-spreading than 
focusing on the vehicle’s creators, and it may have the virtue of 
necessitating that a broader audience - including the vehicle’s 
owner - participate in funding the insurance pool, and that too 
may be more fair.
The attribution of rights to robots and the creation of a personality 
of its own, is not a novelty. In Brazilian legal doctrine, Marco Aurélio de 
Castro in his work dated back to 2009, titled “Law and Post-Humanity: 
When Robots Will Be Rights Subjects” (CASTRO, 2009), already 
argued in that direction. 
In line with Lehman-Wilzig’s teachings, Castro argues that there 
is no clear meaning for the concept of “person”, therefore it cannot 
be argued that to be deemed a person, it is necessary to be a human-
being. Today we have the precedent of legal entities framed with the 
legal status of a person25 (CASTRO, 2009)26. Castro then defends 
the possibility of artifacts also falling under this concept, since a 
robot can perform activities previously considered to be exclusive to 
human beings, such as: predicting, choosing, learning, understanding, 
interpreting, analyzing, deciding, feeling27, among other abilities and 
skills. In Castro’s words (CASTRO, 2009)28:
Habermas to the text can be sustained by the fact that in Habermas morality is a 
result of an argumentative process between free and autonomous beings. 
25 With the purpose, for example, of better managing the property rights.
26 The legal concept of a person is changeable and is constantly evolving. For example, 
Afro-descendants have once been excluded from this category, at the time of 
slavery. Therefore, one cannot relate the legal concept of a person to Homo sapiens. 
In analogy, etymologically the term robot means forced labor. There is nothing to 
prevent them from migrating to the category of rightsholders as well, since they 
perform the same actions as human beings. 
27 A reservation is necessary at this point because even if robots can feel and 
demonstrate emotions as if they were sensuous, the authenticity of these reactions 
is questioned since they would not be genuine, but at most a representation (or 
emulation), analogous to human actors when they simulate these emotions in a play, 
for example, feelings in certain roles, not being considered by many as something 
genuine. Because of this, the Italian jus-philosopher Ugo Pagallo calls this ‘artificial 
autonomy’.
28 Original text: “Descobertos os elementos que, reunidos ou isoladamente resultam 
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Having discovered the elements that, together or separately, 
result in the personality of the jurisdictional individual, it is 
lawful to state that if another entity is found endowed with these 
same elements, the logical conclusion is to attribute the same 
judicial status of a person. […] Brain and computer are not 
equivalent, a fact of little importance because if its manifestation 
is and effect or an intelligent act, what causes it will have to 
be intelligent, because what remains in the thought cannot be 
evaluated, only its result. What happens inside a computer, 
when in operation, is often an unfathomable mystery, as it is 
still the mystery of what occurs in the brain when we think. 
Given that each Intelligent Thing has a different potential, 
Castro also advocates a differentiation analogous to the civil and penal 
distinction based on human capacity. Therefore, only intelligent Things 
with the same human characteristics could be considered absolutely 
capable. What he proposes is that parameters or thresholds be created 
so that, from a legal point of view, there are: incapable robots (those 
without moral responsibility), relatively capable robots (those who are 
monitored and supervised, and whose most critical decisions require 
human intervention), or those who are as capable as a human adult, 
without legal restrictions. 
One of the important features to consider is the learning speed 
and individual evolution of the robot (based on data processing), which 
may represent in some cases the infeasibility of an educational process, 
thus limiting its moral and legal liability. 
But how could one punish a robot? It could not be as simple as 
“pulling the plug”. In this case, there are two viable options: rehabilitation 
and indemnification. The first would involve reprogramming the guilty 
robot. The second, would be to compel the same to compensate the 
victim for the damage caused. 
In such a context, the European resolution is of extreme 
relevance. The proposition in assigning a new type of personality, an 
electronic one, considering the characteristics of Intelligent Things, 
na personalidade do indivíduo jurisdicizada, é lícito afirmar que, se outro ente for 
encontrado dotado desses mesmos elementos, a conclusão lógica é a de se atribuir o 
mesmo status jurídico de pessoa. [...] Cérebro e computador não se equivalem, o que 
pouco importa, pois, se a sua manifestação for um efeito ou ato inteligente, o que 
o causar haverá de ser inteligente, pois o que permanece no pensamento não pode 
ser de forma alguma avaliado, apenas seu resultado. O que acontece no interior de 
um computador, quando em funcionamento, muitas vezes é um mistério insondável, 
como ainda é o mistério do que ocorre no cérebro quando pensamos.”. 
182
Revista Direitos Culturais | Santo Ângelo | v. 13 | n. 31 | p. 153-190 | set./dez. 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.20912/rdc.v13i31.2816
coupled with the idea of  compulsory insurance or a compensatory fund 
can be an important first step.
The new European proposal reflects a practical and prompt 
response to the previously mentioned problem of “distributed 
irresponsibility”29, which occurs when there is no clear connection 
between an agent and the harm generated.
Caitlin Sampaio Mulhollan addressed the problem of distributed/
diffuse liability in her thesis on the presumption of causality. In her 
analysis, Caitlin Mulholland faces the scenario of unclear causal 
nexus between agents reinforcing the concept of alternative causality. 
According to Mulholland, in view of the existence of a single causal 
nexus that cannot be identified directly, we can infer its presumption 
from the economic group, making it possible to repair the damages 
caused by facilitating the burden of proof for the victim.
However, when we think of the damages that have occurred 
within complex sociotechnical systems, we have an application of the 
causal nexus and of even more challenging legal liability. This is because 
we are often talking about the action caused by a sum of agencies of 
human beings, institutions and intelligent things with autonomy and 
agency power of their own. In this case, the focus on the economic 
group, despite being able to respond to several cases of damages, may 
not be sufficient for the fair allocation of liability in the IoT and artificial 
intelligence Era (MULHOLLAND, 2010).
Therefore, as a pragmatic response to this scenario of uncertainty 
and lack of legal appropriateness, the European proposal suggests that 
in case of damages the injured party may either take out the insurance 
or be reimbursed through the compensatory fund.30
29 This legal phenomenon is also called by other authors as “problem of the many 
hands” or “accountability gap”.
30 The type of insurance that should be applied to the case of intelligent robots and 
which agents and institutions should bear this burden is still an open question. The 
European Union’s recent report (2015/2103 (INL)) issued recommendations on the 
subject, proposing not only mandatory registration, but also the creation of insurance 
and funds. According to the European Parliament, insurance could be taken by both 
the consumer and the company in a similar model to those used by the car insurance. 
The fund could be either general (for all autonomous robots) or individual (for each 
category of robot), composed of fees paid at the time of placing the machine on the 
market, and / or contributions paid periodically throughout the life of the robots. It 
is worth mentioning that, in this case, companies would be responsible for bearing 
this burden. Despite this proposal, however, the topic continues open to debate, 
with new alternatives and more interesting models - such as private funds, specific 
records, among other possibilities - that will not be the subject of a deep analysis in 
this thesis.
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It is worth highlighting the section on Liability as determined 
by the Resolution (PARLAMENTO EUROPEU, 2017) (EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, 2016): 
Liability:
31. Calls on the Commission, when carrying out an impact 
assessment of its future legislative instrument, to explore the 
implications of all possible legal solutions, such as:
a) establishing a compulsory insurance scheme whereby, 
similarly to what already happens with cars, producers or 
owners of robots would be required to take out insurance cover 
for the damage potentially caused by their robots;
b) ensuring that a compensation fund would not only serve the 
purpose of guaranteeing compensation if the damage caused 
by a robot was not covered by an insurance – which would in 
any case remain its primary goal – but also that of allowing 
various financial operations in the interests of the robot, such as 
investments, donations or payments made to smart autonomous 
robots for their services, which could be transferred to the fund;
c) allowing the manufacturer, the programmer, the owner or the 
user to benefit from limited liability insofar as smart autonomous 
robots would be endowed with a compensation fund – to which 
all parties could contribute in varying proportions – and damage 
to property could only be claimed for within the limits of that 
fund, other types of damage not being subject to such limits;
d) deciding whether to create a general fund for all smart 
autonomous robots or to create an individual fund for each and 
every robot category, and whether a contribution should be paid 
as a one-off fee when placing the robot on the market or whether 
periodic contributions should be paid during the lifetime of the 
robot;
e) ensuring that the link between a robot and its fund would be 
made visible by an individual registration number appearing in 
a specific EU register, which would allow anyone interacting 
with the robot to be informed about the nature of the
f) creating a specific legal status for robots, so that at least the 
most sophisticated autonomous robots could be established as 
having the status of electronic persons with specific rights and 
obligations, including that of making good any damage they 
may cause, and applying electronic personality to cases where 
robots make smart autonomous decisions or otherwise interact 
with third parties independently (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
2016).
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Still, this step should be closely followed by a continuous debate 
on the ethical principles that should guide such technical artifacts, 
coupled with an adequate governance of all the data used in the 
construction and development of these agents.
In addressing the importance of a profound discussion in society 
on creating a new personality and regulation of these new technologies, 
Lawrence B. Solum confirms that (LAWRENCE, 1992):
Our theories of personhood cannot provide an a priori chart for 
the deep waters at the borderlines of status. An answer to the 
question whether artificial intelligences should be granted some 
form of legal personhood cannot be given until our form of life 
gives the question urgency. But when our daily encounters with 
artificial intelligence do raise the question of personhood, they 
may change our perspective about how the question is to be 
answered. And so it must be with the hard questions we face 
today. Debates about the borderlines of status-about abortion, 
about the termination of medical treatment, and about rights for 
animals-will not be resolved by deep theories or the intuitions 
generated by wildly imaginative hypotheticals. Of course, many 
of us do believe in deep theories; we subscribe to a variety of 
comprehensive philosophical or religious doctrines. But in 
a modem, pluralist society, the disagreement about ultimate 
questions is profound and persistent. Resolution of hard cases 
in the political and judicial spheres requires the use of public 
reason. We have no realistic alternative but to seek principled 
compromise based on our shared heritage of toleration and 
respect. If there is no common ground on which to build a 
theory of personhood that resolves a hard case, then judges must 
fall back on the principle of respect for the rights of those who 
mutually recognize one another as fellow citizens.
From a legal standpoint, it is fundamental to keep in mind the 
new nature of a diffused liability, potentially dispersed in space, time 
and agency of the various actants in the public sphere. We need to think 
about the context in which assumptions on liability are made. The 
question that is presented to us is not only how to make computational 
agents liable, but how to reasonably and fairly apply this liability. We 
must, therefore, think of a “shared liability” between the different actors 
working in the sociotechnical network and their spheres of control and 
influence over the presented situations and over other agents.
However, we are still far from obtaining a reasonable 
consensus31 on the establishment of appropriate ethical parameters 
31 In the present article, it is argued that the consensus must be constructed according 
to Jurgen Habermas’s proposal, that is, through dialectical conflicts in the public 
sphere.
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for the development of algorithms and other intelligent Things. These 
agents can influence relationships between people, shaping behaviors 
and world views, especially and more effectively when part of their 
operation enjoys high technological complexity and autonomy, as it 
happens in the case of Artificial Intelligence systems with the capacity 
of reasoning and learning according to deep learning32 techniques in 
artificial neural networks (AMARAL, 2015).
It is evident that these elements are consistently exerting more 
influence in the way we organize ourselves in society and, therefore, 
the scientific and legal advance cannot distance itself from the ethical 
issues evidently involved. The role of law in this context must be re-
interpreted. The legal regulation, democratically construed in the 
public sphere, should provide the appropriate architecture to for the 
construction of proper ethical channels so that data can flow and non-
human agents can act and be developed within the prescribed ethical-
juridical limits. The limits must follow a post-humanist perspective, 
being capable of envisioning Things as agents in the public sphere, but 
with a human rights’ based approach to guide its development.
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